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ABSTRACT
We examine whether macroprudential policies and capital controls can contribute to enhancing financial
stability in the face of large capital inflows. We construct new indices of foreign currency (FX)-related
prudential measures, domestic prudential measures, and financial-sector capital controls for 51 emerging
market economies over the period 1995–2008. Our results indicate that both capital controls and FX-related
prudential measures are associated with a lower proportion of FX lending in total domestic bank credit
and a lower proportion of portfolio debt in total external liabilities. Other prudential policies appear
to help restrain the intensity of aggregate credit booms. Experience from the global financial crisis
suggests that prudential and capital control policies in place during the boom seem to have enhanced
































I.   INTRODUCTION 
The strong recovery in capital inflows to emerging market economies (EMEs) since the 
sudden stop in late 2008-early 2009 is giving rise to (at least) two sets of concerns. The first 
relates to macroeconomic challenges, especially the intense pressure on a number of 
emerging-market currencies, which, if not sustained, may create costly dislocations when 
exchange rates come down, given the erosion in competitiveness and possible exposure to 
foreign-currency denominated debt on domestic balance sheets. The second relates to 
financial-stability risks, especially the possibility that some of the flows may not be 
channeled towards productive uses, and may thus end up fueling credit and asset price booms 
that may not be sustainable, amplifying financial fragilities down the road.  
 
Such concerns have led to renewed interest in the effectiveness and design of 
macroprudential policies and the possible use of capital controls—that is, measures that treat 
transactions between residents and nonresidents less favorably than those amongst 
residents—in helping to manage financial-stability risks associated with inflows. Systematic 
investigations of the impact of macroprudential policies and capital controls on the financial-
stability risks associated with inflows have nevertheless been lacking.
2 This paper thus aims 
to fill a gap in the existing literature by examining the nexus between various 
macroprudential policies, controls on capital inflows, and economic and financial stability. 
As regards capital controls, we focus exclusively on inflow controls.  
 
For the purpose of our analysis, we group the available policy tools into four broad 
categories: (i) domestic prudential regulations, (ii) foreign currency (FX)-related prudential 
measures, (iii) financial-sector specific capital controls, and (iv) economy-wide capital 
controls. We then assess the impact of these various measures on the structure of external 
liabilities; the growth of domestic banking system credit; and the currency composition of 
domestic bank lending. To the extent that portfolio debt is the riskiest type of external 
liability, and credit booms—especially in foreign currency—can exacerbate financial 
fragilities, measures that reduce these concerns should be associated with greater resilience 
of the economy to financial crises. To test this hypothesis, we exploit the “natural 
experiment” afforded by the recent (2008–09) global financial crisis, which triggered 
downturns of varying intensities across emerging market economies, and see whether 
                                                 
2 Several studies examine the impact of overall institutional quality on the composition of the external liability 
structure (for example, Razin, Sadka, and Yuen, 1998, 2000; Wei, 2001), and the association between financial 
regulatory quality and credit booms (for example, Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006; Barajas, Dell’Ariccia, and 
Levchenko, 2007; Mendoza and Terrones, 2008; Bakker and Gulde, 2010). A few recent studies, particularly in 
the context of Central and Eastern European economies, also investigate the impact of policies related to foreign 
currency borrowing on foreign currency lending (for example, Rosenberg and Tirpak, 2009).   2 
 
 
countries that had prudential measures and capital controls in place before the crisis also 
fared better during the crisis (controlling for other characteristics). 
 
While several indices of economy-wide capital controls have been put forward in the recent 
literature, composite measures of financial sector-specific capital controls, and prudential 
regulations for a wide range of emerging market economies, have hitherto been unavailable. 
Using information from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER), we construct new indices 
for the regulation of FX transactions in the domestic financial sector, and for financial-sector 
specific capital controls. We also construct an index of domestic prudential regulations based 
on a survey of IMF desk economists. These three indices, together with Schindler’s (2009) 
index of economy-wide controls on inflows, are used in our empirical analysis.  
 
Our results suggest that FX-related prudential measures as well as capital controls, are 
associated with a lower proportion of FX loans in domestic bank lending. Second, other 
prudential regulations (i.e., measures that do not discriminate either on the basis of currency 
denomination or the residency of the parties to the transaction) are associated with smaller 
aggregate credit booms. Third, capital controls and FX-related prudential measures are 
associated with a shift away from portfolio debt flows towards portfolio equity and FDI 
flows within the country’s overall external liability structure. The estimated effects presented 
below, moreover, are not only statistically significant, but also economically relevant. For 
instance, moving from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile of capital controls restrictiveness or FX-
related prudential measures lowers the share of portfolio debt in external liabilities by about 
4-7 percentage points and the share of FX credit in the domestic banking sector by 20-25 
percentage points. Consistent with these results, we also find reasonably strong 
(economically and statistically-significant) associations between pre-crisis policies and the 
extent of economic resilience during the period of sudden stop—suggesting that capital 
controls and prudential measures can indeed reduce financial fragilities.  
 
Our results dovetail nicely with the existing literature, which has mostly focused on possible 
macroeconomic effects of capital controls—on the aggregate volume of flows, the exchange 
rate, and monetary policy autonomy. By and large, evidence on this is mixed. The survey and 
meta-analysis of Magud, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2007) points to capital controls having only 
limited effectiveness in altering the overall volume of capital inflows (and hence the level of 
the exchange rate). Consistent with our findings, evidence that capital controls may affect the 
composition of capital flows is stronger, with at least some studies finding that capital 
controls have managed to lengthen the maturity of inflows.
3 
                                                 
3 On altering the composition (lengthening maturities) of inflows, see De Gregorio, Edwards, and Valdés (2000) 
on Chile, and Cardenas and Barrera (1997) on Colombia. On monetary policy autonomy, De Gregorio, 
Edwards, and Valdés (2000) find that capital controls allowed Chile’s central bank to target a higher domestic 
interest rate over a period of 6 to12 months; Ma and McCauley (2008), and Hutchison et al. (2009) find that 




Previous studies on capital controls have, however, not examined other aspects of financial 
stability—for example, the share of foreign currency lending and the riskiness of the external 
liability structure—that we consider here. Further, the mixed evidence of the effectiveness of 
capital controls on the aggregate volume of flows (and hence on the exchange rate) has been 
taken to imply a severe limitation on their use in practice. It is worth pointing out, however, 
that from a financial-stability perspective, altering the composition of inflows without 
affecting the aggregate level would be the ideal outcome. One of the contributions of our 
paper is therefore to highlight this distinction, and show that while capital controls may be of 
limited (or only temporary) use in affecting the aggregate volume of flows, inflow controls 
(together with FX-related and other prudential measures) can form an important part of the 
policy toolkit to reduce the financial-stability risks associated with inflow surges.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the 
instruments in the prudential toolkit to manage the macroeconomic and financial stability 
risks posed by excessive capital inflows. Section 3 describes the construction of indices of 
financial sector capital controls, FX-related prudential measures, and domestic prudential 
policies. Section IV presents some empirical evidence on the association between the policy 
indices with financial fragilities and crisis resilience. Section 5 concludes. 
 
II.   THE PRUDENTIAL TOOLKIT 
A.   Defining the Toolkit 
Beyond purely macroeconomic policies, policy makers have at their disposal a number of 
tools to help mitigate financial-stability risks associated with capital inflows. It is convenient 
to group these according to whether they discriminate in terms of the residency of the parties 
to the capital transaction (capital controls), the denomination of the currency of the 
transaction (FX-related prudential measures), or neither (other prudential measures). By 
definition, prudential measures apply only to the regulated domestic financial system 
(notably banks, but sometimes also other financial institutions), whereas capital controls can 
apply to all residents (though they can also be applied selectively to specific sectors).   
 
Capital controls are measures that restrict capital transactions (or transfers and payments 
necessary to effect them) by virtue of the residency of the parties to the transaction.
4 Controls 
                                                                                                                                                       
interest differentials are significant and persistent in China and India, which maintain more extensive capital 
controls. However, Ghosh, Ostry and Tsangarides (2010) find significantly lower monetary autonomy in 
countries with fixed exchange rates compared with more flexible regimes, even in countries with relatively 
closed capital accounts. 
4 There is no unique generally accepted legal definition of capital controls. In the broadest sense, they are 
measures meant to affect the cross-border movement of capital. In its Code of Liberalization of Capital 
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may be economy-wide, sector- specific (usually the financial sector), or industry specific (for 
example, “strategic” industries in the case of controls on FDI). Measures may apply to all 
flows, or may differentiate by type or duration of the flow (debt, equity, direct investment; 
short-term vs. medium- and long-term). Since much of our analysis focuses on the financial-
sector, we distinguish between financial-sector and economy-wide capital controls below. 
FX-related prudential measures discriminate by virtue of the currency denomination of the 
capital transaction, not the residency of the parties to the transaction. These measures are 
applied to domestic financial institutions, primarily to banks. Limits on banks’ open FX 
position (as a proportion of their capital) are common, as are limits on banks’ investments in 
FX assets.
5 Other measures may serve to limit FX lending by domestic banks, especially to 
borrowers that lack a natural hedge, including for example, differential reserve requirements 
on liabilities in local currency and FX. These types of measures will affect the composition 
of liabilities, and will also affect the volume to the extent that forcing foreigners to bear the 
currency risk affects their willingness to lend.  
Other prudential measures are all other prudential regulations that discriminate neither on 
the basis of the currency of the transaction or the residency of the parties to the transaction. 
Typical measures include maximum loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, limits on domestic credit 
growth, asset classification and provisioning rules, sectoral limits on loan concentration, 
dynamic loan-loss provisions, and counter-cyclical capital requirements. 
While this categorization is analytically convenient, one should bear in mind that policies in 
one group can also affect risks that are more directly related to another group of policies. For 
example, capital controls may have the effect of reducing FX-denominated capital 
transactions (and, likewise, FX-related measures may have the effect of reducing 
resident/non-resident transactions), even if that is not their primary intent.   
B.   Measuring Capital Controls and Prudential Regulations 
Like most discrete policy variables, capital controls and prudential measures are difficult to 
quantify. Commonly used de jure measures (which are based on the IMF’s AREAER) 
include Chinn and Ito (2008), and Quinn and Toyoda (2008), who provide an index of 
overall capital account restrictiveness (combining both inflow and outflow controls), and 
Schindler (2009), who differentiates between (economy-wide) inflow and outflow controls. 
Some studies have resorted to de facto measures or outcome variables to proxy for the de jure 
                                                                                                                                                       
Movements, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2009) considers measures to be 
capital controls subject to liberalization obligations if they discriminate between residents and nonresidents. 
5 In some currency-board or fixed-exchange-rate countries, exposures in the peg currency are excluded in the 
calculation of the open position. In our empirical analysis, asymmetric open position limits, which introduce 
different limits on short and long positions, are categorized as FX-related measures—even though these could 
be considered a form of capital control inasmuch as they act to discourage inflows (e.g., a lower short position 
limit could limit capital inflows).   5 
 
 
regulation, but clearly that cannot be done here as we are interested in the effect of policy 
measures on outcomes. 
 
We therefore develop three new indices of de jure measures of (i) capital controls specific to 
the financial sector; (ii) FX-related prudential measures, and (iii) other prudential measures. 
For financial sector specific controls and FX-related measures, we obtain information from 
the IMF’s AREAER for 51 EMEs over the period 1995–2008.
6 For other prudential 
measures, we conduct a survey of IMF country teams and compile information for 42 EMEs 
for the years 2005 and 2007. For economy-wide capital controls, we rely on the index 
provided by Schindler (2009).  
Financial sector capital controls 
Our measure of financial sector-specific capital controls (Fincont) is based on whether the 
AREAER documents provisions that apply only to the financial sector, and that discriminate 
based on the residency of the parties to the transaction. Specifically, whether measures exist 
that (i) impose limits on financial sector borrowing from abroad; (ii) restrict the maintenance 
of accounts abroad; or (iii) impose differential treatment of accounts held by nonresidents 
(e.g., different reserve/liquid asset requirements, interest rate, or credit controls). Each type 
of restriction, if it exists, is assigned a value of one (and zero otherwise), and this information 
is used to create two composite measures—a simple average of restrictions on (i) the 
financial sector’s borrowing from abroad, and (ii) differential treatment of accounts held by 
nonresidents (labeled Fincont1), and an average of all the three components: (i) differential 
treatment of accounts held by nonresidents; (ii) limits on borrowing from abroad; and (iii) 
restrictions on maintenance of accounts abroad (denoted as Fincont2).
7 
Figure 1(a) plots the composite Fincont2 index over 1995–2008 across different regions, and 
gives an indication of how financial sector-specific controls have evolved over time. On 
average, both Europe and Latin America appear to be the least restrictive in terms of capital 
controls on the financial sector, while Asia is the most restrictive. This pattern mimics that of 
economy-wide capital controls on inflows, as measured by Schindler’s (2009) index (labeled 
here as Kcont). Figure 1(b) shows that Asia is more intensive in economy-wide capital 
account restrictions on inflows than either Europe or Latin America. Interestingly, while the 
average intensity of economy-wide capital controls has been falling somewhat in EMEs over 
the years as countries have moved towards capital account liberalization, the prevalence of 
                                                 
6 See Table A1 for the list of countries in the sample, which is based on the sample of EMEs covered in the 
IMF’s Early Warning Exercise (IMF, 2010). 
7 Ideally, the index and its subcomponents would capture the intensity, rather than just the existence, of the 
various restrictions, but in practice this is almost impossible to do for administrative measures without making 
arbitrary choices. The index is therefore coded based on binary variables for the presence of restrictions (as is 
the case of other indices in the literature constructed from the AREAER).  6 
 
 
financial sector-specific capital controls increased in the second half of 2000s, presumably in 
response to perceived risks associated with inflow surges. 
Foreign currency-related prudential measures 
Our index of FX-related prudential regulations is based on whether measures exist to (i) limit 
lending locally in foreign currency; (ii) limit purchase of locally issued securities 
denominated in foreign currency; (iii) impose differential treatment of deposit accounts in 
foreign exchange; and (iv) limit open foreign exchange positions.
8 As before, a score of one 
is assigned when such restrictions exist (and zero otherwise). Based on this information, we 
create two indices: FXreg1, which is a simple average of restrictions on lending locally in 
foreign exchange, and differential treatment of deposit accounts in foreign exchange; and 
FXreg2, which is an average of all four components.
9 Figure 1(c) shows that while FX-
related regulations are more common in Asia, their adoption has increased over the years in 
both Asia and Latin America. By contrast, FX regulations are the least prevalent in emerging 
Europe, and seem to have been relaxed gradually over the years.  
Domestic prudential regulations  
Our measures of domestic prudential regulations cover three aspects of macro prudential 
policy: maximum loan-to-value (LTV) ratios; existence of reserve requirements; and limits 
on credit concentration to specific sectors. While the existence of maximum LTV ratios and 
sector-specific credit concentration limits are coded by binary variables, the reserve 
requirement measure is coded as 0 if the reserve requirement ratio is below 10 percent; 0.5 if 
it is in the range of 10-20 percent; and 1 if it is greater than 20 percent. As above, we create 
two measures to capture domestic prudential regulations—Domreg1, which is an average of 
the reserve requirement variable, and limit on credit concentration to specific sectors; and 
Domreg2, which also includes the LTV limit. Figure 1(d) shows that, between 2005 and 
2007, the prevalence of domestic prudential regulations increased across all regions. 
Nevertheless, Asian EMEs appear to rely the most on domestic macro prudential measures, 
while European EMEs the least. 
Measures in the Run-up to the Global Financial Crisis 
How prevalent were these measures in the years leading up to the 2008 global financial 
crisis? Figure 2 provides a detailed snapshot of the individual measures comprising the 
various indices that were in place in our sample of emerging market economies in 2007.  
                                                 
8 If the limits on open FX positions differentiate between residents and nonresidents, they would constitute a 
capital control on the financial sector. However, disaggregated data on residents versus nonresidents open 
foreign exchange position limits is relatively limited, and where such information is available, there are only a 
handful of cases where limits existed on nonresidents’ but not on the residents’ assets and liabilities.  
9 Typically, countries with a currency board exclude the anchor currency from the computation of limits on FX 
positions; we code such cases as not having limits on open FX positions.  7 
 
 
Around one half of the countries had controls on bond inflows, with slightly fewer having 
controls on portfolio equity and even fewer on FDI flows.
10 Somewhat surprisingly, capital 
controls specific to the financial sector were not more common than economy-wide controls. 
FX-related policies tend to be the most common type of measure, with over half of the 
countries imposing restrictions on lending locally in FX, and stricter requirements for deposit 
accounts in FX. Virtually all countries had limits on banks’ open FX positions. 
In general, the constructed measures tend to be positively correlated with each other as well 
as with the measure of economy-wide capital account controls on inflows (Figure 3).
11 The 
correlation is higher between capital controls (both economy-wide and financial sector) and 
FX-related prudential regulations than among these measures and other prudential policies. A 
detailed pre-crisis cross-sectional snapshot for the EMEs reveals that most countries had 
more than one set of measures in place, with about one-third having measures pertaining to 
all the categories considered here—capital controls, FX-related prudential regulations, and 
other prudential measures (Figure 4).
12 All countries barring Bulgaria (which has a currency 
board) and Ecuador (which is dollarized) had some form of FX-related prudential regulations 
in place, and several countries (for example, Chile, Costa Rica, Korea, and Israel) had 
imposed capital controls on the financial sector but not on the rest of the economy. 
III.   ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Using these measures, we assess the extent to which capital controls and prudential 
regulations are associated with a number of financial fragilities—for example, the 
composition of external liabilities, the extent of FX lending by domestic banks, and the 
intensity of credit booms. We also ask how policies in place during the boom may affect the 
intensity of the bust (especially in relation to the decline in economic activity relative to the 
pre-crisis trend). Our estimations pertain to cross-sectional data, which is based on the 
"natural experiment" afforded by the most recent financial crisis, as well as a panel data set 
covering the period 1995–2008.
13 
                                                 
10 It is very common for countries to have FDI restrictions on strategic industries, even in the U.S., but these are 
not coded as restrictions in Schindler’s (2009) data. 
11 Another popular index for capital account restrictions is the one constructed by Chinn and Ito (2008). 
However, unlike Schindler (2009), their index does not distinguish between restrictions on inflows from 
restrictions on outflows. Nevertheless, the correlation between the Chinn-Ito index and our measures of 
financial sector specific capital controls and forex regulations is about 0.5. 
12 Only one country (Ecuador)—out of the 34 EMEs for which we had information on all policy measures—had 
no type of regulation in place in 2007. 
13 We estimate all specifications using pooled ordinary least squares (OLS). This is because inclusion of country 
fixed effects in the panel regressions makes it difficult to identify the effect of our policy measures, which tend 
to be slow moving variables. In the pooled regressions, however, we control for region specific effects to 
capture time-invariant factors specific to countries in different regions, and annual dummies to control for 
shocks common across countries, and cluster the standard errors at the country level. The sample size in the 
panel estimations drops drastically when indices for other prudential measures (Domreg1and Domreg2) are 
(continued)  8 
 
 
A.   Baseline Specification 
Composition of external liabilities 
To assess the association between capital controls or prudential measures and the share of 
debt in the country's total external liabilities, we estimate benchmark specifications including 
the Kcont, Fincont, Fxreg, and Domreg indices, while controlling for the country's overall 
institutional quality, and a composite measure of vulnerability to capital account crises.
14 
Columns (1) through (13) in Table 1 present the cross-sectional results for the pre-crisis 
liability structure of EMEs.
15 Countries rated more vulnerable or with weaker institutions 
appear to rely more heavily on debt financing, presumably because foreign investors are 
more reluctant to lend to such countries using risk-sharing instruments (e.g., equity).
16 
 
Among the variables of interest—economy-wide capital controls have a statistically strong 
effect on tilting the composition of external liabilities away from debt liabilities. The 
estimated coefficient for FX-related prudential measures is also statistically significant when 
included individually in the regression, albeit at the 10 percent level. To put estimates in 
perspective, moving from the sample's 25th to the 75th percentile of either the capital 
controls or FX-prudential index lowers the share of debt liabilities in total liabilities by about 
4-7 percent. While sizable, the effect is in line with previous studies that also tend to find 
quantitatively important effects of capital controls on the composition of inflows.
 17 
 
While capital controls, particularly those on bond inflows, can have a direct effect on the 
share of debt liabilities, FX-related prudential measures that limit a bank’s ability to pass on 
the currency risk to domestic borrowers can also affect debt liabilities indirectly, by limiting 
the bank’s ability to fund itself abroad to the extent that foreign lenders demand a significant 
premium for holding currency risk. When included jointly in the regression, however, the 
statistical significance of the association between economy-wide capital controls and a lower 
                                                                                                                                                       
included since, for these measures, the available data is for two years (2005 and 2007) only. Table A2 describes 
the variables and data sources. 
14 Our measure is based on 18 indicators spanning the external, fiscal, financial and real sectors of the economy 
(we exclude variables related to external debt liabilities). The measure is a weighted average of dummies for 
whether or not each of the 18 indicators is above a threshold associated with crises: see IMF (2010, 2011). 
15 The number of observations across estimated specifications is not uniform as data availability, particularly on 
policy measures, varies considerably across countries. 
16 Several studies, for example, Wei (2001), suggest that weak institutions may increase the importance of debt 
in total liabilities, but reduce the relative importance of FDI, as foreign banks are more likely to be bailed out 
than foreign direct investors in the event of a crisis. FDI could also be lower in institutionally weak countries if 
foreign investors are concerned about the likely exposure to requests for bribes and red tapism. By contrast, 
others (for example, Razin, Sadka, and Yuen, 1998 and 2000) argue that institutionally vulnerable countries 
would have a higher share of FDI in total external liabilities since FDI is relatively difficult to expropriate. 
17 See, for example, De Gregorio, Edwards, and Valdés (2000) on the maturity of flows in Chile, and Clements 
and Kamil (2009) on FDI vs non-FDI flows in Colombia.   9 
 
 
share of debt liabilities survives (Table 1, columns 8-13). This makes intuitive sense 
inasmuch as FX-related prudential measures can, at most, affect flows that are intermediated 
through the banking system, whereas Kcont potentially apply to all flows.  
The cross-sectional results are supported by the panel specification (Table 1, columns 14-26), 
where in addition to the overall institutional quality and external vulnerability, we also 
control for the level of financial development and (log of) real per capita income of the 
economies. The estimated coefficient of Kcont is statistically significant in almost all 
specifications, and the magnitude of the estimated effect is similar to that reported above. 
Examining the individual components of Kcont, both in cross-section and panel data, the 
association between Kcont and debt liabilities stems from the effect of capital controls on 
bond inflows, which strongly reduce the share of debt liabilities in total liabilities.
18  
Foreign Currency Lending and Domestic Credit booms 
To examine whether capital controls and prudential measures are associated with lower  
FX-denominated lending by the domestic banking system (another potential source of 
financial fragility), we estimate the effect of these measures on the share of foreign currency 
loans in total bank credit, while controlling for the effects of the exchange rate regime, the 
level of financial development (proxied by the share of private credit to GDP), and the 
overall institutional quality. The exchange rate regime is included to capture the possibility 
that countries with fixed exchange rate regimes may have higher foreign currency lending, 
while countries with more developed financial markets are likely to have less FX lending.
19 
The cross-sectional evidence from the recent crisis, presented in Table 2 (columns 1-13) 
indicates that countries with economy-wide capital controls and FX-related prudential 
regulations had lower pre-crisis domestic borrowing in FX. Both measures retain their 
(strong) statistical significance when included jointly in the regression (column 10).
 20 
The estimates suggest that moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of Kcont or Fxreg2 is 
associated with a 20-25 percentage point reduction in the share of foreign currency-
denominated lending in total bank lending in 2007. While the magnitude of the effects appear 
to be large, they are plausible since FX-related prudential measures can have a direct impact 
on foreign currency lending by domestic banks (sufficiently restrictive measures can in 
                                                 
18 The results for individual components of the indices are not reported here but are available upon request. 
19 In panel estimations, we also control for the (log of) real per capita income. The results confirm that fixed 
exchange rate regimes are associated with a significantly higher share of FX lending, while a higher level of 
financial market development and per capita income (in panel estimations) is associated with a lower share of 
FX lending.  
20 The obtained results remain qualitatively similar if FX credit-to-GDP ratio is used as the dependent variable.  10 
 
 
principle drive such lending to zero).
21 In particular, we find a strong association between 
restrictions on lending locally in foreign exchange, and limits on open FX positions and 
lower FX lending.  
The results obtained from the panel dataset (Table 2, columns 14-26) confirm these findings, 
but in addition show a statistically strong association between financial sector-specific capital 
controls and lower FX borrowing. Specifically, column (22) shows that an increase in the 
composite financial sector-specific controls index, Fincont2, from the 25th percentile to the 
75th percentile is associated with about an 11 percentage points reduction in the proportion 
of FX-denominated lending. This result is also plausible because when banks borrow abroad, 
they typically do so in foreign currency. Therefore, capital controls that impede external 
borrowing, combined with limits on banks' open FX positions, will also tend to reduce 
foreign currency lending by banks. 
In addition to FX lending, we also examine whether regulatory measures have any effect on 
overall domestic lending. Table 3 reports the results of the effect on capital controls and (FX- 
related and other) prudential measures on the magnitude of credit booms (defined as the 
change in private credit-to-GDP ratio), while controlling for other factors such as the level of 
financial development, overall regulatory/institutional quality, the availability of creditor 
information sharing institutions (à la Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer, 2007), the exchange 
rate regime, and lagged private credit to GDP ratio as an initial condition.
22 
Evidence from both the recent crisis (Table 3, columns 1-13) and panel specifications 
(columns 14-26) indicate that other prudential measures are significantly associated with 
smaller credit booms. Moving from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile of domestic prudential 
regulations slows credit growth during the boom years of 2003-07 by about 1-1.5 percentage 
points per year. Among the individual components, reserve requirements and limits on credit 
concentration in specific sectors appear to be effective in restraining lending by the domestic 
financial system. We do not, however, find any significant association between FX-related 
regulations (or capital controls) and the size of credit booms, perhaps because FX lending 
typically does not constitute a large share of total lending.  
Crisis resilience 
If, as Tables 1-3 suggest, capital controls and prudential measures are associated with lower 
financial fragilities, then this should show up in greater resilience of the economy in the 
                                                 
21 Of course, that could come at a cost in terms of volume of credit, and in some cases cause lending to migrate 
to unregulated corners of the financial sector. 
22 In addition, in panel estimations we also include the lagged real GDP growth rate and (log of) real GDP per 
capita. The estimation results show that countries with higher institutional quality, fixed exchange rate regimes, 
and higher real growth experienced larger domestic credit booms, whereas a higher initial private credit to GDP 
ratio and the existence of public or private credit registries/bureaus is associated with smaller booms.  11 
 
 
event of a crisis. We estimate the effect of these measures on the change in average real GDP 
growth in 2008–09 relative to the country’s  average growth over 2003–07. Columns (1) 
through (13) in Table 4 indicate that economy-wide capital controls are indeed associated 
with improved growth resilience, while controlling for overall institutional quality, change in 
terms of trade, and real GDP growth of trading partners.
23 Thus, countries that had capital 
controls in place in the years leading up to the global financial crisis fared better during the 
crisis. Moving from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile of capital control restrictiveness or FX-
related prudential measures reduces the growth decline in the aftermath of the crisis by 2.5-
3.5 percentage points (the average growth decline in our sample is 5.2 percentage points).  
Regressions for individual components (not reported here) show that this result is largely 
driven by controls on bond inflows. 
While FX-related prudential regulations appear to have some effect on growth resilience 
during crises when included on their own, the effect of capital controls tends to dominate 
when both are included together in the regression (column 11). Other prudential measures, 
particularly, limits on sectoral lending and reserve requirements, seem to complement the 
effect of capital account restrictions, with both measures retaining significance when 
included together. Evidence from past crises episodes (in columns 14-24) supports the 
association of capital controls with growth resilience—specifically, we find that among the 
EMEs that experienced crises in earlier years, those with higher economy-wide capital 
account restrictions in their pre-crisis years experienced smaller growth declines when the 
crises occurred.
24 These results support those of some earlier studies, for example, Gupta et 
al. (2007), who find that the fall in output during crisis episodes is significantly lower if 
capital controls were in place in the years running up to the crisis.
25 
B.   Sensitivity Analysis 
The results presented in Tables 1-4 suggest that both capital controls and prudential measures 
are strongly associated—in the cross-sectional and panel data—with reduced financial 
vulnerabilities. We now examine the robustness of our results to model specification, 
alternative indices of policy measures, estimation methods, and country sample. 
                                                 
23 The change in terms of trade, and real GDP growth of trading partners are constructed as the difference 
between the average of 2008–09 and 2003–07. Using the average growth in 2008–09 instead of the difference 
from average growth over 2003–07 has no effect on the results. Further, the finding of a negative association 
between restrictions on capital inflows and output decline in the crisis is robust to the inclusion of several other 
control variables as reported below. 
24 Past crises are those identified by the IMF (2010) database over 1995–2008. Growth decline for these crises 
cases is computed as the difference between real GDP growth rate in the crisis year and the average past 5 year 
growth rate. Domreg1 and Domreg2 are not included in these regressions (Table 4, columns 14-24) because of 
insufficient observations. 





While the regressions reported in Tables 1-4 include several relevant control variables, to 
ensure that the strong association between our policy measures and financial fragilities/crisis 
resilience is not driven by omitted variables, we also estimate alternative specifications with 
additional control variables, particularly, to capture country characteristics such as the level 
of financial development (as proxied by stock market capitalization), soundness of the 
financial system (proxied by bank return on equity), and the type of political regime in place 
(proxied by the polity index).  
 
Tables 5 and 6 report the results with these additional variables added to both the cross-
section and panel specifications for debt liabilities, FX lending, domestic credit booms, and 
crisis resilience, respectively. We find that the results reported in Tables 1-4 generally 
survive the addition of other control variables—specifically, economy-wide capital controls 
remain associated with a lower proportion of debt liabilities, lower FX lending, and improved 
crisis resilience; FX-related prudential measures have a strong dampening effect on FX-
lending; and other domestic prudential measures lead to smaller aggregate credit booms.
26 
In addition to model specification, we check the sensitivity of our results to the construction 
of policy indices. Specifically, we replace our financial sector-specific capital controls and 
prudential indices (which are simple averages of the individual components, as discussed in 
Section III) with the first principal components of the individual sub-indices. The results (not 
reported here) using these alternative measures are very similar to those obtained in Tables 1-
4, both in terms of statistical significance and the estimated magnitude of the association 
between policy measures and financial/economic vulnerabilities. 
Endogeneity 
One concern when estimating the effect of capital controls on the aggregate stock or flow of 
external liabilities relates to reverse causality—that is, countries may strengthen capital 
account restrictions in response to a surge in capital inflows, which could give rise to a 
spurious positive association between controls and inflows. While such endogeneity concerns 
may be less pertinent when considering the impact of controls on the composition, rather 
than on the overall level or flow of liabilities, endogeneity bias—if it exists—would tend to 
reduce the estimated effects of capital controls and other prudential measures.
27 The 
                                                 
26 In the crisis resilience regressions, we also control for other policy variables such as the pre-crisis foreign 
exchange reserves to GDP ratio, exchange rate regime, and the monetary policy and fiscal policy stance over 
the crisis (proxied by the change in interest rates and cyclically adjusted fiscal balance to GDP ratio in the crisis 
year vis-à-vis the past five years, respectively), but do not find this to have any significant effect on the 
estimated coefficient of the economy-wide capital controls variable (results available upon request).  
27 The lack of association between capital controls and capital inflows in some studies is often attributed to 
econometric identification (see Ostry et al., 2010).  13 
 
 
relatively strong findings above are therefore, despite, rather than because of, any potential 
endogeneity bias (which would tend to bias the results toward finding no effect).
28  
 
Nevertheless, we use lagged values of the capital controls index in all estimations to mitigate 
the endogeneity concerns, and, in addition, apply an instrumental variable two-stage least 
squares (IV-2SLS) approach to explicitly address reverse causality. For this, we require at 
least one valid instrument that is correlated with the capital controls index but is not expected 
to affect the dependent variable directly. We consider two such potential instruments—a 
(binary) variable reflecting the existence of a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) between 
country i and the United States in year t, and a (binary) variable indicating whether the 
country is a member of the European Union (EU). These variables are expected to be 
important determinants of capital controls because both BITs with the United States and EU 
membership constrain the use of capital account restrictions, but there is no a priori reason to 
believe that they would be directly related to, say, the composition of external liabilities.
29 
The validity of our instrument is supported by the results from the first stage of the IV-2SLS 
estimation: the estimated coefficients of BITs and EU membership are negative and mostly 
statistically significant indicating that countries which have ratified a BIT with the United 
States, or are members of the EU have lower prevalence of capital controls on inflows. The 
F-test of the hypothesis that the estimates in the first stage regression are jointly equal to zero 
is rejected, and the R-squared of all first stage specifications (reported in Table 7) is in the 
range of 0.30-0.60, offering some evidence on the appropriateness of our instruments. The 
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions also cannot be rejected in most cases, and supports 
the validity of the instruments. The results of the second stage of the estimation support the 
strong association between capital controls and crisis resilience in both the recent and past 
crises episodes. The relationship between capital controls and debt liabilities becomes weaker 
in the cross-sectional specification, but is stronger in the panel regressions (Table 7, panel b). 
The magnitude of the effect is however somewhat larger, consistent with the intuition above 
that not controlling for potential endogeneity would bias the coefficient downwards.  
                                                 
28 Another type of bias might arise if countries that have capital controls tend to pursue less market-friendly 
policies, and it is the latter that dissuades investors from investing in the country; however, our vulnerability 
measure should capture much of this.  
29 In growth resilience regressions, there could be a concern that BITs and EU membership may be directly 
associated with the dependent variable. The correlation between growth performance and BITs/EU membership 
is only moderate in both cross-sectional and panel data. The Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions 
(reported in the last row of Table 7) also supports the validity of the chosen instruments for the growth 
resilience regressions. Moreover, existence of a BIT is not especially associated with greater assistance during 
the recent global financial crisis—of the 20 EME countries in our sample with a BIT, none received a Federal 
Reserve swap line (Korea has an FTA which has not been approved by the U.S. Congress yet, and Mexico has 
an exception for balance-of-payments difficulties under NAFTA that is less restrictive on capital controls than 




Finally, we check the robustness of our results to the country sample, dropping some of the 
smallest countries; and dropping countries that are classified as advanced economies in the 
IMF's World Economic Outlook classification. In a recent study of 24 EMEs, Cline (2010) 
finds no relationship between capital account openness and the output decline during the 
crisis, and questions whether such a relationship exists (or whether it is driven by the 
experience of the Baltic countries in the EME sample, which he considers 
unrepresentative).
30 While we believe that including the Baltic countries in the sample is 
important, as their experience in the recent financial crisis offers important insights, we re-
estimate the cross-sectional and panel specifications without the three Baltic countries 
(Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) in the sample.  
As shown in Table 5, excluding the Baltic countries from the sample weakens the statistical 
significance of the association between economy-wide capital controls on inflows and the 
growth decline in the recent crisis (although has no effect on the sign of the estimated 
coefficient for Kcont). Nevertheless, we find that the association between growth decline in 
past crises and capital controls on inflows remains robust (Table 6). Exclusion of countries 
that may be identified as advanced economies otherwise (specifically, Czech Republic, 
Iceland, Israel, and Korea), does not change the estimated sign and magnitude of the 
coefficients either; and capital controls remain strongly associated with the share of debt 
liabilities, FX lending and crisis resilience in both cross-section and panel specifications. 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
This paper analyzes the effects of prudential policies and capital controls on the financial-
stability risks associated with capital inflow surges and the extent to which policies in place 
during booms may help to mitigate the damage that can occur during busts. We construct 
new indices for prudential measures and for financial sector-specific capital controls for 51 
emerging market economies over the period 1995–2008.  
Our findings suggest that capital controls and various prudential policies can help reduce the 
riskiness of external liability structures and the extent of risky foreign-currency lending in the 
economy. Prudential policies that do not discriminate on the basis either of currency or 
residency can also help to mitigate the intensity of domestic credit booms. By helping to 
reduce the buildup of financial fragilities during the boom phase, prudential policies and 
capital controls can help to enhance economic resilience during the bust when foreign capital 
                                                 
30 Cline (2010), however, uses a composite index of capital account restrictiveness, which does not distinguish 
between controls on inflows and controls on outflows, whereas our analysis, based on the Schindler index, 
distinguishes explicitly between inflow and outflow controls (so, for example, India and Turkey are similar in 
terms of their capital account restrictiveness as defined by the Quinn index; but differ considerably based on the 
Schindler inflows index).   15 
 
 
dries up and flows out. Our empirical results suggest the benefits from appropriate pre-crisis 
policies are both statistically significant and economically relevant.  
Our paper has not discussed potential costs associated with use of prudential policies and 
capital controls. Micro-level studies have shown that capital controls can make access to 
financing relatively more difficult to small and medium enterprises (Forbes, 2007) and 
domestically-owned firms (Harrison, Love and McMillan, 2004). However, if the choice is 
between capital controls and prudential policies, the issue is not completely clear-cut. While 
capital controls may indeed make financing for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) more 
difficult, these firms typically rely more on domestic bank financing than on foreign flows, 
whereas larger and internationally-known firms are more likely to be able to access foreign 
financing. Therefore, prudential measures on the domestic banking system are also likely to 
disproportionately affect the availability of finance to SMEs. Further, excessive limits on 
banks could lead to disintermediation and proliferation of non-regulated financial institutions 
(Wakeman-Linn, 2007). 
By definition, prudential measures can only have traction on flows that are intermediated 
through the regulated financial institutions. Direct borrowing from abroad, through branches 
of foreign banks, or intermediated through unregulated institutions such as finance 
companies, may not be subject to domestic prudential regulation. Moreover, applying 
prudential measures to domestic banks may cause flows to migrate to unregulated corners of 
the financial system as a result of regulatory arbitrage.
31 This can also create an un-level 
playing field for domestic banks relative to foreign competitors and non-banks. While it may 
be possible to widen the perimeter of regulation, this normally takes time, and at least in the 
interim, capital controls may have a useful role.  
Beyond a fuller treatment of the relative costs and benefits of the various measures, future 
research might usefully consider a number of issues related to their design, including how 
they can be geared to temporary versus more persistent capital flows, whether they should 
be broad or narrowly targeted, and whether they should be price or quantity-based.
                                                 
31 For example, when Croatia imposed “speed limits” on credit growth in 2003, banks moved part of their loan 
portfolio to affiliated leasing companies. That speed limit was later replaced by higher marginal reserve 
requirements on foreign liabilities, with regulations being continuously refined to close loopholes exploited by 
the banks. Their experience suggests that targeted controls may lead to migration to unregulated corners of the 
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(d) DomesticPrudential Regulations Index*
*Average of reserve requirements, LTV limit, and limit on 
credit concentration to specific sectors.
 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on IMF’s AREAER and Schindler (2009).  20 
 
 
Figure 2. Frequency Distribution of Pre-Crisis Policy Measures*  
(in percent of total observations) 
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Source: IMF's AREAER, Schindler (2009), and IMF country desk survey.
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* Kcont=Schindler's (2009) capital controls on inflow index. Fincont=mean of binary 
variables reflecting restrictions on financial sector's borrowing abroad, maintenance of 
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Source: IMF staff estimates based on AREAER, Schindler (2009), and country desk survey. The universe comprises 34 countries for which data on all measures is available. Countries outside the ovals are 
those for which the relevant policy measures were not in place. In 2007, Bulgaria did not have controls on bond, equity and FDI inflows, but had restrictions on financial credit inflow. For analytical purposes, 
only cases where the reserve requirement exceeds 10 percent are considered as having reserve requirements; countries in the sample where reserve requirements existed in 2007 but were less than 10 










Table 1: Policy Measures and Debt Liabilities 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
Kcont -11.517** -11.311* -9.395 -10.814* -12.946* -10.628* -9.691* -9.856*** -10.307** -7.518 -9.586** -8.225*** -2.751 -2.977
(5.045) (6.656) (8.727) (6.086) (6.705) (5.286) (5.234) (3.475) (4.447) (4.975) (4.234) (2.248) (4.443)(4.229)
Fincont1 -7.129 -1.094 -0.545 4.523
(5.719) (7.507) (3.201) (4.614)
Fincont2 -10.578 -3.727 -5.412 -1.956
(6.406) (10.544) (3.430) (5.189)
Fxreg1 -7.970* -2.462 -1.846 -1.542
(4.492) (5.733) (3.152) (3.661)
Fxreg2 -8.614 0.850 -5.071 -4.835**
(6.488) (9.063) (3.912) (2.218)
Domreg1 -2.680 -2.610 -4.434 -4.291
(7.863) (7.555) (6.076) (6.402)
Domreg2 -5.022 -3.817 1.663 -0.756
(8.240) (8.006) (6.217) (6.653)
Observations 38 35 35 37 37 32 30 35 35 37 37 32 30 467 481 478 521 492 69 65 400 397 438 420 60 56
R-squared 0.388 0.352 0.375 0.387 0.376 0.383 0.434 0.393 0.396 0.422 0.420 0.434 0.477 0.468 0.471 0.474 0.445 0.416 0.264 0.291 0.479 0.467 0.452 0.440 0.268 0.315
Domreg2 is the average of reserve requirements, restrictions on concentration in specific sectors, and LTV ratios.
Recent crisisa Panel data (1995-2008)b
a/ Dependent variable is share of debt liabilities in total liabilities in 2007 (in percent). Kcont, Fincontrol, and Fxreg are averaged over 2000-05. Domreg pertain to the measures in place in 2005. Constant, and a (lagged) composite index of 
external vulnerability (excluding debt liabilities), and an indicator of overall institutional quality (ICRG index) in 2007 included as controls in all regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10, 5, and 
1 percent levels respectively.
b/ Dependent variable is share of debt liabilities in total liabilities (in percent). Kcont, Fincontrol, Fxreg and Domreg are lagged one year. Domreg is available for 2005 and 2007 only. Constant, and region specific and time effects included in all 
regressions. Lagged composite index of external vulnerability, (log of) real GDP per capita, institutional quality (ICRG) index and a proxy for financial market development (private credit to GDP) included as controls in all regressions. 
Clustered standard errors (on country level) reported in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively.
Notes: Kcont is Schindler's (2009) capital controls on inflow index.
Fincont1 is the average of binary variables reflecting restrictions on financial sector's borrowing abroad, and differential treatment of nonresident accounts. 
Fincont2 is the average of binary variables reflecting restrictions on financial sector's borrowing abroad, maintenanance of accounts abroad, and differential treatment of accounts held by nonresidents. 
Fxreg1 is the average of binary variables reflecting restrictions on financial sector's lending locally in foreign exchange, and differential treatment of deposit accounts in foreign exchange. 
Fxreg2 is the average of binary variables reflecting restrictions on financial sector's lending locally in foreign exchange, purchase of locally issued securities denominated in forex; differential treatment of deposit accounts in foreign 
exchange; and open FX position limits.










Table 2: Policy Measures and Foreign-Currency Lending 
123 4 5 6 7 8 91 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 71 8 1 9 2 02 12 22 32 42 52 6
Kcont -38.888** -38.155** -37.782* -25.944** -15.863 -44.688**-44.306** -30.626*** -27.779*** -21.790** -17.197* -11.344 -33.889***-33.731***
(14.399) (15.638) (18.697) (12.034) (11.895) (17.704) (17.980) (8.941) (9.408) (9.614) (9.757) (9.832) (10.800) (10.859)
Fincont1 -11.323 -6.792 -4.937 -6.043
(18.468) (17.145) (8.938) (8.670)
Fincont2 -22.901 -2.996 -16.049 -17.050*
(17.307) (22.260) (10.023) (9.949)
Fxreg1 -37.459*** -22.700** -27.328*** -24.674***
(10.136) (9.531) (7.220) (6.972)
Fxreg2 -52.233*** -39.219*** -36.814*** -38.768***
(12.374) (12.466) (8.587) (7.237)
Domreg1 6.410 -1.742 -2.304 -2.772
(17.680) (17.823) (12.384) (15.563)
Domreg2 5.522 5.074 1.310 3.212
(16.755) (17.862) (14.592) (17.292)
Observations 30 27 27 30 30 25 25 27 27 29 29 24 24 356 373 372 408 402 60 59 309 308 344 342 52 51
R-squared 0.599 0.484 0.504 0.597 0.660 0.410 0.408 0.615 0.612 0.649 0.694 0.643 0.644 0.469 0.293 0.317 0.408 0.428 0.169 0.161 0.469 0.488 0.535 0.563 0.350 0.344
Fxreg2 is the average of binary variables reflecting restrictions on financial sector's lending locally in forex, purchase of locally issued securities denominated in forex; differential treatment of deposit accounts in foreign exchange; and limits on open forex positions.
Domreg1 is the average of reserve requirements and restrictions on concentration in sectors.
Domreg2 is the average of reserve requirements, restrictions on concentration in specific sectors, and LTV ratios.
Recent crisisa Panel data (1995-2008)b
a/ Dependent variable is FX credit to total credit in 2007. Kcont, Fincontrol, and Fxreg are averaged over 2003-05. Domreg pertain to the measures in place in 2005. Constant, lagged private credit to GDP, a dummy variable for the de facto exchange rate regime (=1 if 
fixed exchange rate; 0 otherw sie), and institutional quality (ICRG) index included as control variables in all regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively.
b/ Dependent variable is FX credit to total credit. Kcont, Fincontrol, Fxreg, and Domreg are lagged by one year. Domreg is available for 2005 and 2007 only. Constant, and region specific and time effects included. Lagged private credit to GDP, lagged dummy variable 
for a de facto fixed exchange rate regime, (log) of real GDP per capita, and institutional quality (ICRG) index included as control variables in all regressions. Clustered robust standard errors (on country level) in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10, 5, 
and 1 percent levels respectively.
Notes: Kcont is Schindler's (2009) capital controls on inflow index.
Fincont1 is the average of binary variables reflecting restrictions on financial sector's borrow ing abroad, and differential treatment of nonresident accounts. 
Fincont2 is the average of binary variables reflecting restrictions on financial sector's borrow ing abroad, maintenanance of accounts abroad, and differential treatment of accounts held by nonresidents. 





















Table 3: Policy Measures and Domestic Credit Booms 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 41 51 61 71 8 1 9 2 02 12 22 32 4 2 5 2 6
Kcont -6.472 -8.294 -12.913 -3.541 -4.371 -8.036 -6.685 0.618 3.182 1.454 2.119 5.611 -6.895 -6.476
(7.049) (10.929) (10.562) (8.769) (8.081) (6.832) (7.612) (3.293) (4.345) (4.636) (3.171) (3.605) (4.943) (4.913)
Fincont1 -0.256 4.122 -1.351 -2.832
(6.187) (10.147) (2.814) (3.873)
Fincont2 2.091 10.267 1.788 1.096
(5.882) (9.677) (3.294) (4.588)
Fxreg1 -1.417 -3.981 0.831 -1.217
(6.657) (6.493) (3.244) (3.455)
Fxreg2 -3.795 -3.917 -2.311 -6.975
(7.925) (7.821) (4.457) (5.548)
Domreg1 -14.613** -13.049* -10.404** -10.506**
(6.545) (7.046) (4.270) (4.815)
Domreg2 -13.195* -13.957* -7.605 -9.037*
(6.416) (7.471) (4.628) (5.259)
Observations 36 33 33 36 34 32 30 33 33 35 33 31 29 388 366 363 411 383 64 60 317 314 360 341 57 53
R-squared 0.478 0.469 0.470 0.463 0.467 0.521 0.529 0.485 0.503 0.481 0.482 0.534 0.564 0.326 0.350 0.349 0.326 0.345 0.442 0.442 0.364 0.360 0.337 0.363 0.408 0.417
b/ Dependent variable is the cumulative three year change in private credit to GDP. Kcont, Fincontrol, and Fxreg are averaged over three lags. Domreg is available for 2005 and 2007 only, and is lagged by one year. Constant, region 
specific and time effects, an institutional quality (ICRG) index, dummy variable for fixed exchange rate regime (=1 if fixed exchange rate regime; 0 otherw ise), dummy variable for public or private credit registries/bureaus, lagged (log 
of) real GDP per capita, lagged real growth rate of GDP, and three-year lagged private credit to GDP as initial condition included in regressions. Clustered robust standard errors (on country level) in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively.
Notes: Kcont is Schindler's (2009) capital controls on inflow index.
Domreg2 is the average of reserve requirements, restrictions on concentration in specific sectors, and LTV ratios.
Fincont1 is the average of binary variables reflecting restrictions on financial sector's borrowing abroad, and differential treatment of nonresident accounts. 
Fincont2 is the average of binary variables reflecting restrictions on financial sector's borrow ing abroad, maintenanance of accounts abroad, and differential treatment of accounts held by nonresidents. 
Fxreg1 is the average of binary variables reflecting restrictions on financial sector's lending locally in forex, and differential treatment of deposit accounts in foreign exchange. 
Fxreg2 is the average of binary variables reflecting restrictions on financial sector's lending locally in forex, purchase of locally issued securities denominated in forex; differential treatment of deposit accounts in foreign exchange; 
and limits on open forex positions.
Domreg1 is the average of reserve requirements and restrictions on concentration in sectors.
Recent crisisa Panel data (1995-2008)b
a/ Dependent variable is the change in private credit to GDP over 2003-07. Kcont, Fincontrol, and Fxreg are averaged over 2003-05. Domreg1 and Domreg2 pertain to the measures in place in 2005. All regressions include a constant, 
institutional quality (ICRG) index, a dummy variable for de facto exchange rate regime (=1 if fixed exchange rate regime; 0 otherwsie), and a dummy variable for public or private credit registries/bureaus in 2007. Robust standard 


















Table 4. Policy Measures and Crisis Resilience 
1234567 8 91 0 1 1 1 2 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
Kcont 5.153** 5.980** 7.120*** 2.335 5.426* 4.198* 3.657 5.802*** 6.575***7.171*** 5.923*** 6.084***
(2.300) (2.311) (2.523) (2.648) (3.139) (2.380) (2.654) (1.727) (1.819) (1.800) (1.714) (1.889)
Fincont1 0.133 -2.914 -0.403 -1.690
(3.271) (3.119) (2.573) (2.401)
Fincont2 1.198 -4.106 1.091 -2.653
(3.073) (3.379) (3.201) (3.531)
Fxreg1 5.277** 3.969 0.821 -0.482
(2.160) (2.471) (2.359) (2.597)
Fxreg2 4.231 -0.333 3.978 0.223





Observations 40 36 36 39 39 33 31 36 36 39 39 33 31 30 31 31 32 31 27 27 28 27
R-squared 0.236 0.190 0.194 0.272 0.180 0.151 0.086 0.287 0.293 0.285 0.237 0.242 0.156 0.352 0.147 0.150 0.149 0.188 0.378 0.380 0.344 0.354
b/ Dependent variable is the difference between real GDP growth rate in crisis year and the average growth rate over past 5 years. Kcont, Fincont, and Fxreg are lagged one year. 
Recent crisisa
Notes: All regressions include a constant and control variables (growth in trading partners, terms of trade change, and an institutional quality (ICRG) index). Robust standard errors in 
parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. Kcont is Schindler's (2009) capital controls on inflow index. Fincont1 is the average of binary variables 
reflecting restrictions on financial sector's borrowing abroad, and differential treatment of nonresident accounts. Fincont2 is the average of binary variables reflecting restrictions on financial 
sector's borrowing abroad, maintenanance of accounts abroad, and differential treatment of accounts held by nonresidents. Fxreg1 is the average of binary variables reflecting restrictions on 
financial sector's lending locally in foreign exchange, and differential treatment of deposit accounts in foreign exchange. Fxreg2 is the average of binary variables reflecting restrictions on 
financial sector's lending locally in foreign exchange, purchase of locally issued securities denominated in forex; differential treatment of deposit accounts in foreign exchange; and limits on open 
forex positions. Domreg1 is the average of reserve requirements and restrictions on concentration in sectors. Domreg2 is the average of reserve requirements, restrictions on concentration in 
specific sectors, and LTV ratios.
a/ Dependent variable is the difference between real GDP growth rates averaged over 2008-09, and 2003-07. Kcont, Fincont, and Fxreg are averaged over 2000-02. Domreg1 and Domreg2 
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Table 5: Sensitivity Analysis: Recent Crisis Cross-Section 












Kcont -11.517** -5.022 -11.576** -8.556 -12.105* -8.808 -11.937**
Fincont1 -7.129 -2.820 -7.322 -4.579 -6.596 -5.425 -7.891
Fincont2 -10.578 -4.155 -10.624 -9.283 -10.406 -8.007 -10.678
Fxreg1 -7.970* -0.564 -8.321 -5.875 -7.598 -5.487 -7.647
Fxreg2 -8.614 -2.303 -8.875 -5.029 -8.036 -6.085 -8.532
Domreg1 -2.680 4.167 -2.416 -1.549 -2.547 -0.974 -1.586
Domreg2 -5.022 6.464 -5.569 -3.914 -4.625 -6.738 -3.777
Kcont -38.888** -32.133* -40.188** -29.789* -40.143** -36.946** -42.769**
Fincont1 -11.323 -12.112 -8.877 -17.151 -11.483 -6.860 -10.402
Fincont2 -22.901 -17.516 -21.157 -27.311* -22.952 -16.384 -23.649
Fxreg1 -37.459*** -39.362*** -37.826*** -32.574*** -36.751*** -34.028*** -40.160***
Fxreg2 -52.233*** -48.788*** -55.168*** -46.399*** -51.529*** -48.591*** -56.719***
Domreg1 6.410 13.145 6.188 8.280 6.890 12.235 7.231
Domreg2 5.522 5.476 7.816 7.813 6.671 4.665 7.306
Kcont -6.472 -7.181 -4.643 -13.781** -8.608 -4.023 -4.955
Fincont1 -0.256 3.242 1.321 -4.369 -0.886 1.135 0.401
Fincont2 2.091 2.611 2.640 0.288 1.908 4.462 3.409
Fxreg1 -1.417 -0.758 -0.868 -8.671 -4.019 -0.219 -0.484
Fxreg2 -3.795 -4.420 -2.708 -12.672 -6.345 -1.337 -2.207
Domreg1 -14.613** -19.119*** -15.954** -17.679** -14.245** -13.275* -14.091*
Domreg2 -13.195* -11.601 -9.758 -16.377* -17.704** -15.074** -11.752*
Kcont 5.153** 4.182* 5.039** 4.590* 5.497* 2.004 5.593** 5.022*
Fincont1 0.133 -0.679 0.023 0.581 -0.210 -0.932 0.331 -0.322
Fincont2 1.198 -0.193 1.250 1.235 0.785 -0.831 1.660 0.352
Fxreg1 5.277** 4.720* 4.885** 5.080** 5.166** 2.675* 5.561** 4.934**
Fxreg2 4.231 3.019 3.670 3.797 3.895 2.149 4.689 3.375
Domreg1 4.650* 5.484** 4.717* 4.743 4.725* 3.151 4.881 4.677*




Change in Private Credit to GDP
Crisis Resilience
8(Log of) forex reserves to GDP ratio added to the baseline specification.
5(Log of ) real GDP per capita added to the baseline specification.
Notes: Debt liabilities is the share of debt liabilities in total liabilities in 2007 (in percent). FX credit is the share of FX loans in total loans 
in 2007 (in percent). Change in private credit to GDP is calculated over 2003-07. Crisis resilience is the difference between real GDP 
growth rates averaged over 2008-09, and 2003-07. Robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 1 0, 5, and 1  percent levels 
respectively. Values in cells indicate the estimated coefficients for relevant policy measures indicated in row headers. Thus, for example, -
1 1 .51 7 in the first cell (column 1 ) is the estimated effect of capital controls on the share of debt liabilities in the benchmark specification, 
and -5.022 is the estimated effect of capital controls on the share of debt liabilities when the stock market capitalization variable is 
included in the benchmark specification. 
2Stock market capitalization variable added to the baseline specification.
3Banks' return on equity added to the benchmark specification.
4The ICRG index replaced with the polity index (reflecting the type of political regime) in the baseline specification.
6Exluding the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) from the sample and re-estimating baseline specification.
7Exluding the countries identified as advanced economies (Czech Rep., Iceland, Israel, and Korea) from the sample and re-estimating 
baseline specification.
1Baseline specification refers to columns (1 )-(7) in Tables 1 -4.  
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Table 6: Sensitivity Analysis: Panel Data 










Kcont -9.856*** -6.345* -10.140*** -8.239** -9.476** -10.593***
Fincont1 -0.545 1.094 -0.922 -1.041 0.112 -0.910
Fincont2 -5.412 -3.261 -5.948* -6.744* -4.983 -5.860*
Fxreg1 -1.846 1.980 -2.181 0.234 -2.354 -3.055
Fxreg2 -5.071 -1.979 -6.410 -3.514 -4.277 -6.045
Dom reg1 -4.434 1.851 -5.276 -3.538 -2.575 -2.235
Dom reg2 1.663 7.500 1.241 3.312 1.480 2.316
Kcont -30.626*** -28.117*** -30.544*** -32.649*** -28.316*** -30.762***
Fincont1 -4.937 -4.906 -6.372 -4.263 -5.440 -5.257
Fincont2 -16.049 -14.192 -18.175* -15.404 -15.686 -16.261
Fxreg1 -27.328*** -25.722*** -28.435*** -27.749*** -26.667*** -28.332***
Fxreg2 -36.814*** -33.364*** -39.797*** -37.420*** -34.687*** -38.830***
Dom reg1 -2.304 4.169 -4.099 4.766 4.764 -4.903
Dom reg2 1.310 1.851 0.212 7.547 2.373 -0.415
Kcont 0.618 0.820 0.625 -1.594 1.892 0.539
Fincont1 -1.351 -1.081 -1.355 -0.771 -0.856 -3.584
Fincont2 1.788 1.992 1.790 2.942 2.749 -0.250
Fxreg1 0.831 0.923 0.791 -1.541 1.600 0.133
Fxreg2 -2.311 -1.678 -2.212 -4.594 -0.216 -0.353
Dom reg1 -10.404** -13.991*** -11.535*** -13.047*** -7.820* -9.607**
Dom reg2 -7.605 -7.853* -7.849* -8.416 -8.267* -8.242*
Kcont 5.802*** 5.083*** 5.789*** 6.698*** 4.562*** 6.322*** 5.823***
Fincont1 -0.403 -0.572 -0.454 0.181 -0.778 -0.544 -0.310
Fincont2 1.091 -0.875 1.111 2.417 0.247 0.901 1.226
Fxreg1 0.821 0.816 0.820 1.508 -2.392 0.057 1.097
Fxreg2 3.978 3.495 3.997 4.619 -0.144 3.604 4.712
2Stock market capitalization variable added to the baseline specification.
3Banks' return on equity added to the benchmark specification.
7(Log of) forex reserves to GDP ratio added to the baseline specification.




Change in Private Credit to GDP
Crisis Resilience
Notes: Debt liabilities is the share of debt liabilities in total liabilities (in percent). FX credit is the share of FX loans in total loans (in 
percent). Change in private credit to GDP is calculated over three years. Crisis resilience is the difference between real GDP growth 
rate in crisis year and the average growth rate over past 5 years. Kcont, Fincontrol, Fxreg and Domreg are lagged one year. Domreg 
is available for 2005 and 2007 only. Clustered robust standard errors (on country level). *, **, and *** indicate significance at 1 0, 5, and 
1  percent levels respectively. Values in cells indicate the estimated coefficients for relevant policy measures indicated in row 
headers. Thus, for example, -1 0.879 is the estimated effect of capital controls on the share of debt liabilities in the benchmark 
specification, and -6.864 is the estimated effect of capital controls on the share of debt liabilities when the stock market 
capitalization variable is included in the benchmark specification. 
estimating baseline specification.
5Exluding the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) from the sample and re-estimating baseline specification.
4ICRG index replaced with the polity index (reflecting the type of political regime) in the baseline specification.
1Baseline specification refers to columns (1 4)-(20) in Tables 1 -4. 
 
 





Table 7. Sensitivity Analysis: Instrumental Variables Approach 
1234 567 89 1 0 1 1 1 2
Kcont -38.962 -52.445 -64.263 -124.504 -145.039 -40.411 -26.952 21.049***21.492***24.818** 31.610** 47.969** 17.950 20.532













Observations 38 35 35 37 37 32 30 40 36 36 39 39 33 31
R2 (1st stage) 0.305 0.442 0.528 0.437 0.503 0.222 0.226 0.453 0.465 0.536 0.551 0.647 0.418 0.428
Sargan test (p-value) 0.15 0.25 0.30 0.53 0.93 0.26 0.19 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.94 0.90 0.80 0.93
Kcont -11.093* -7.486 7.916 -27.306 -8.904 0.303 2.299 13.979** 20.998* 31.912 18.851** 22.269













Observations 505 407 404 445 426 65 61 29 25 25 26 25
R2 (1st stage) 0.450 0.497 0.560 0.536 0.559 0.467 0.474 0.431 0.472 0.475 0.437 0.479
Sargan test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.86 0.99 0.80 0.77 0.50
b/ Dependent variable is the difference between real GDP growth rate in crisis year and the average growth rate over past 5 years. Kcont is 
instrumented with binary variables that take the value of one if the country has a bilateral investment treaty with the US in year t (and zero 
otherwise); and if the country is in the European Union in year t (and zero otherwise). Fincont, and Fxreg are lagged one year. All regressions 
include a constant and control variables (growth in trading partners, terms of trade change, lagged (log of) real GDP per capita, and institutional 
quality index.
[b] Panel data (1995-2008)
Debt liabilitiesa Growth resilienceb
Domreg2 is the average of reserve requirements, restrictions on concentration in specific sectors, and LTV ratios.
Kcont is Schindler's (2009) capital controls on inflow index.
Fincont1 is the average of binary variables reflecting restrictions on financial sector's borrowing abroad, and differential treatment of 
Fincont2 is the average of binary variables reflecting restrictions on financial sector's borrowing abroad, maintenanance of accounts abroad, 
Fxreg1 is the average of binary variables reflecting restrictions on financial sector's lending locally in foreign exchange, and differential 
Fxreg2 is the average of binary variables reflecting restrictions on financial sector's lending locally in foreign exchange, purchase of locally 
Domreg1 is the average of reserve requirements and restrictions on concentration in sectors.
Notes:All specifications estimated using the instrumental variable-two stage least squares approach. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *, 
**, and *** indicate signficance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively.
Debt liabilitiesa Growth resilienceb
a/ Dependent variable is share of debt liabilities in total liabilities (in percent). Kcont is instrumented w ith binary variables that take the value of 
one if the country has a bilateral investment treaty with the US in year t (and zero otherwise); and if the country is in the European Union in year 
t (and zero otherwise). Fincont, Fxreg and Domreg are lagged one year. Domreg is available for 2005 and 2007 only. Constant, and regional and 
time effects included in all regressions. Lagged composite index of external vulnerability, (log of) real GDP per capita, and overall institutional 










APPENDIX A: DATA SOURCES 
Table A1. List of Countries in the Sample 
Algeria Ecuador Kazakhstan Romania
Argentina Egypt Korea Russian Federation
Armenia El Salvador Latvia Serbia, Republic of
Bosnia & Herzegovina Estonia Lebanon South Africa
Brazil Georgia Lithuania Sri Lanka
Bulgaria Guatemala Malaysia Thailand
Chile Hungary Mexico Tunisia
China,P.R.: Mainland Iceland Morocco Turkey
Colombia India Pakistan Ukraine
Costa Rica Indonesia Panama Uruguay
Croatia Israel Peru Venezuela, Rep. Bol.
Czech Rep. Jamaica Philippines Vietnam
Dominican Republic Jordan Poland  
Table A2. Variable Description and Sources 
Variable Description Obs. Mean Std. Dev Source
Capital controls on the financial sector Index (between 0 (no restrictions) to 1 
(restrictions))
595 0.4 0.3 Authors' calculations based on IMF's 
AREAER
Foreign currency regulations Index (between 0 (no restrictions) to 1 
(restrictions))
602 0.6 0.3 Authors' calculations based on IMF's 
AREAER
Domestic prudential measures Index (between 0 (no restrictions) to 1 
(restrictions))
78 0.3 0.3 Authors' calculations based on IMF's 
AREAER
Capital controls on inflows index Index (between 0 (no restrictions) to 1 
(restrictions))
564 0.4 0.4 Schindler (2009)
Debt liabilities to total external liabilities In percent 691 60.9 17.6 Milesi-Ferretti and Lane (2007)
FX loans to total loans In percent 460 37.4 27.8 IMF's External Vulnerability database
Private credit to GDP In percent 668 43.2 33.2 IMF's IFS database
Real GDP growth In percent 692 4.6 3.9 IMF's WEO database
Real GDP per capita (Log of) In constant 2000 USD 700 7.8 0.9 World Development Indicators
Foreign reserves to GDP In percent 679 16.3 11.5 IMF's WEO database
Exchange rate regime Binary variable equal to one if fixed 
exchange rate regime, and zero otherwise
700 0.2 0.4 Ghosh, Ostry and Tsangarides (2010)
Stock market capitalization Value of listed shares to GDP 593 0.4 0.5 Beck and Demirguc-Kent (2009)
Bank return on equity In percent 660 0.1 0.2 Beck and Demirguc-Kent (2009)
Institutional quality (ICRG) index Index ( between 0 (high) to 1 (low)) 658 0.7 0.1 International Risk Country Guide 
(http://www.prsg ro up.com /I C R G _M ethod
ology.aspx)
Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) Binary variable equal to one if a BIT exists 
with the US, and zero otherwise
700 0.4 0.5 Trade Compliance Center 
(http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/
All_Trade_Agreements/exp_002699.asp)
 
 
 